Heidegger, Deconstruction and Responsibility: Some Critical Reflections on Nobuhiko Itani’s Paper ‘Beyond the Self’ by Munday, Ian
Title Heidegger, Deconstruction and Responsibility: Some CriticalReflections on Nobuhiko Itani's Paper 'Beyond the Self''
Author(s)Ian Munday
Citation
The Self, the Other and Language : Dialogue between
Philosophy, Psychology and Comparative Education (2009):
37-41
Issue Date2009-02-20
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/142961
RightThe copyright of papers included in this volume belong to eachauthor.
Type Article
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
37 
Heidegger, Deconstruction and Responsibility: 
Some Critical Reflections on Nobuhiko Itani's 
Paper 'Beyond the Self' 
IAN MUNDAY 
Department of Education, University of Cambridge 
Institute of Education, University of London 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper should be read as a direct response to Nobuhiko Itani's paper '''Beyond The 
Self" as a Goal of Education'. I emphasise this point because other writers from the 
. Institute blend their responses with original contributions drawn from their respective 
fields of research. In contrast, what follows should perhaps, in the main, be read as a 
series of critical remarks or queries pertaining to arguments and assertions taken from 
Itani's text. Of course, this is not to say that there will be no deviation along paths 
opened up by Itani's rich discussion. 
II. FINDING COMMONALITY 
One of Itani's objectives in his paper is to find a commonality amongst previous studies 
of ontological education. He looks at the work of a number of writers and notes that 
one theme that links the authors' is the 'deconstruction of education as utilization' 
(ltani, 2008). I think what Itani means by this, is that the respective writers in this 
field show how the technological understanding of being (diagnosed by Heidegger) 
manifests itself in education and then go on to criticize this tendency. Hubert Dreyfus 
provides a useful illustration of what Heidegger's account of the technological 
understanding of being amounts to: 
We don't even seek truth anymore but simply efficiency. For us everything is to 
be made as flexible as possible so as to be used as efficiently as possible. If I had a 
Styrofoam cup here, it would be a very good example. A Styrofoam cup is a perfect 
sort of object, given our understanding of being, namely it keeps hot things hot, and 
cold things cold, and you can dispose of it when you are done with it. It efficiently 
and flexibly satisfies are desires. It's utterly different from, say, a Japanese tea 
teacup, which is delicate, traditional, and socialises people. It doesn't keep the tea 
hot for long, and probably doesn't satisfy anybody's desires, but that's not important 
(Dreyfus, 1987, p. 273). 
The writers Itani refers to are therefore critical of how education is treated in terms 
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of 'utility' -who could doubt the superiority of the Styrofoam cup? This explains 
the treatment of people as 'human resources' and the preoccupation with notions of 
'excellence' and 'what works' at the expense of richer possibilities for thinking about 
what education might be/become. Now, the fact these authors are critical of thinking 
about education in terms of utility is perhaps clear, yet whether this has anything 
to do with deconstruction is another matter. In one sense, taking Itani to task over 
the use of the term 'deconstruction' might seem pedantic. After all, these days, the 
term is often used simply as a synonym for critique. However, issues pertaining to 
'deconstruction' are particularly relevant in the case of Heidegger because (in a sense) 
he coined the term. Indeed, Heidegger's treatment of the term deconstruction features 
in his attempt to find the way out of metaphysics. This entails going back to the origin 
of metaphysics (this origin should not be thought of as an historical moment but a 
structural possibility). To do this involves 'destruction-a critical process in which the 
traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be employed, are de-constructed 
(kritischer Abbau) down to the sources from which they were drawn' (Heidegger, 1982, 
pp.22-23). 
Of course Derrida, whose work is heavily influenced by Heidegger is the philosopher 
most famously associated with 'deconstruction'. Like Heidegger, Derrida wishes to 
challenge metaphysical assumptions regarding the philosophy of presence. However, 
Derrida is suspicious of Heidegger's notion of 'deconstructing down' as this implies the 
distillation down to a primordial essence that brings metaphysics into being. Derrida 
cannot follow Heidegger down this path, yet of course this is the path that Heidegger 
takes in his critique of the 'technological understanding of Being'. For Heidegger, the 
time of the early Greeks provides a model of the gathering of beings under Being. The 
technological understanding of Being marks the late development of a metaphysics that 
departed from this primordial space. Whether or not Itani's 'previous authors' adhere 
to a Heideggerian form of deconstruction is questionable. This is certainly not the 
case with Standish whose general output does not conform to discourses of nostalgia 
pertaining to lost origins. Indeed, as will hopefully become clear when we look at 
Itani's approach to ethics and ontology, it might appear that what marks previous 
ontological approaches to ethics is that they do not engage in de constructive (in the 
Heideggerian sense) strategies and that this is actually what Itani is critical of. 
Unease with Itani's search for commonality amongst earlier and more recent studies 
is compounded by his claim that 'previous studies share the concept of openness 
to the Being itself' (Itani, 2008). Itani does not state this explicitly, but we might 
take him to mean that for the writers he alludes to, going beyond the self involves 
an openness to things as they 'are' and that this marks a departure from the egoistic 
'self's' attempt to control meaning. This kind of control is coterminous with the 
technological understanding of being and must be avoided. Although 'openness' is 
clearly characteristic of previous studies, it is perhaps questionable as to whether or not 
the different contributors treat the terms 'openness' and 'Being' in the same way. For 
example, there is a great deal of difference between the kind of receptiveness to things 
and suspicion of mastery that Standish describes and the kinds of' authentic experience' 
that characterise some of the other approaches described by Itani. Shortly, we shall see 
how Itani, when writing about ethics and ontology, introduces problems pertaining to 
authenticity. 
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III. ETHICS AND ONTOOGY 
A significant part of Itani's analysis focuses on ethical questions. For Itani, previous 
theories of ontological education suffer from bringing what he calls 'naive ethical 
evaluations' into the picture. He argues that writers in the field have apparently replaced 
'the contents of the ontological experience with other concepts such as selflessness, 
responsibility, patience and humility' (Itani, 2008). This assertion raises a few 
questions. Firstly, what were the 'contents' of the ontological experience prior to their 
being replaced? Also, it is hard to imagine how such an experience might be thinkable 
without a commitment to selflessness, responsibility, patience and humility'. Indeed, 
if openness to Being is somehow possible, surely such characteristics are prerequisites 
for its possibility. 
Perhaps we get a clearer picture of Itani's perspective on ethics and ontology when 
he takes the interesting step of citing Adorno's critique of the 'ethical implication in 
ontology'. Following Adorno, Itani appears to be suggesting that putting an ethics of 
openness into ontology leads to submission. The vacuum created by the vague notion 
of openness to Being creates passivity to something beyond the self and that this could 
be anything depending on the political arrangements of time and place. For Adorno, 
Nazism represents an instance of blending ethics into ontology. 
Having cited Adorno, it is surprising that Itani chooses not to focus on Heidegger's 
'unfortunate' involvement with Nazism. It might therefore be helpful to introduce 
Tubbs's powerful treatment of this issue. Indeed, there are some parallels between 
what Itani is after and Tubbs' argument. Tubbs straightforwardly asks: How is it that 
Heidegger ends up being a member of the Nazi party? How does it come about that 
someone who writes about the necessity of the teacher to contain his own withdrawal 
writes: 'knowledge means: to be master of the situation into which we are placed?' 
(Heidegger in Tubbs, 2005, p. 316). 
Tubbs argues that Heidegger grounds 'spirit' or struggle (as regards power) in 
Nazism. When Tubbs talks about spirit, we might take it that he is referring to the third 
partner in the relationship between authority (Das Man) and freedom. The third partner 
is the struggle between these two things. Tubbs argues that Heidegger simply replaces 
this struggle with 'the mastery of the properly educated will of the German people' 
(Tubbs, 2005, p. 317). Heidegger maintains that: 'asking questions is always marching 
ahead, sounding the future' (Heidegger in Tubbs, 2005, p. 317). So it would appear 
that, in some sense, for Heidegger, the future is already known-we are not open to it. 
Heidegger argues that education should represent the spiritual will to serve whereby the 
self is sacrificed for a genuine understanding of Being that is manifested in the destiny 
of the Volk and the National Socialist revolution. 
Tubbs maintains that the relationship between teacher and student is always 
problematised by the struggle regarding power and freedom. The teacher who teaches 
for doubt and questioning is not only concerned with the negation of certainty in theory 
and principle but knows he knows he must bring it about in practice. In this process, 
the teacher can influence the student but in doing so is, in some sense, no longer the 
teacher because the teacher cannot remain the same after the work as before it. The 
work is his education, a work that requires the learning of both teacher and student. 
Tubbs argues that Heidegger's description of the student-teacher relationship 
differs from this, as it is the teacher who calls the student to self-examination and 
questioning-to his own Dasein. Heidegger describes how Being withdraws from the 
question leaving only its trace as 'possibility', and this is the same for the teacher, who 
withdraws from the truth of his teaching to be present as the trace of its possibility. 
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Tubbs maintains that the withdrawal of the teacher is simply a rhetorical ploy. The 
teacher withdraws from what is already known in advance. In doing this he denies the 
student her own work and protects himself from the negative implications of that work. 
Heidegger says that the difficulty of the teacher is 'to let learn' but really he is talking 
about the dissemblance of the teacher who is and remains master. Tubbs argues that it 
is in the risk of the relation to the other, not in the withdrawal from that relation that 
the truly philosophical teacher represents the truth of that dilemma and opposition that 
constitute his work. Heidegger does not risk the difficulty and struggles that will not 
stand being owned by any individual or race. Philosophy of withdrawal becomes the 
philosophy of mastery. 
As mentioned earlier, there are some similarities between what Tubbs and Itani 
are attempting to do. What Tubbs criticises in Heidegger, Itani criticizes in his 
followers-namely filling in a space made room for by a philosophy that masquerades 
as the champion of passivity. Itani argues that bringing ethical weight to ontology, 
results in the kind of control that characterizes a technological understanding of 
Being-the ontological experience becomes a 'means' for 'getting a good personality, 
which is to be evaluated in the well-worn perspective of the ethics'. Here, Itani appears 
to be critical of the aforementioned championing of 'authenticity' . Attempts to achieve 
authenticity do not transcend the technological understanding of being, but reinforce 
it. Consequently, 'openness' if treated in a particular way can (paradoxically) become 
a means of getting control-of bettering oneself. This seems close to what Tubbs says 
about the paradox in Heidegger's thought where openness and standing back can result 
in problematic power relations. Indeed, we might say that both Tubbs and Itani throw 
light on the problematic treatment of the term authenticity. 
Despite some similarities, there are significant differences between Tubbs and 
Itani's arguments. Here is Itani: 'In fact. .. the previous students of ontological 
education have never forgotten our everyday life. Rather ontological education itself 
is still arrested in the materialized world' (2008). Here, talking about ethics, Itani is 
following Heidegger's backward look to the Ancient Greeks when (according to the 
latter) thinking had yet to be compartmentalised into disciplines such as philosophy. 
Here is Heidegger: 'The tragedies of Sophocles-provided such a comparison is at 
all permissible-preserve the ethos in their sagas more primordially than Aristotle' 
s lectures on ethics' (Heidegger, 1982, pp. 22-23). Heidegger is arguing that thinking 
about ethics (as many philosophers do) in terms of virtues or principles impoverishes 
and limits our understanding of what is valuable. Following this line of thought, which 
involves the distillation of metaphysics down to its origins (to the original absence that 
makes metaphysics possible), Itani argues that we must: 
... reconsider the possibility of ontological education by returning to its origin. 
According to Heidegger, the ontological experience is an experience of nothing. 
The quest for the Being compels us to confront the absolute unfathomableness of 
the whole world and even of ourselves. Our life loses all importance, as the Being 
loses its self-evident meanings. No criteria exist that enable us to evaluate the world 
in terms of its utility. Even ethical evaluation is deprived of its significance (Itani, 
2008). 
Here, Itani is replicating Heidegger's desire to move beyond metaphysics and 'ethics'. 
It is not 'authenticity' that Itani finds problematic in the work of writers on ontology, 
but their inauthentic treatment of authenticity-their failure to make the journey back 
to the origin of metaphysics and beyond. In some respects, Itani's critique sounds 
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persuasive-the only way to escape the limits imposed by metaphysics, ethics and 
the technological understanding of being is to wipe the slate clean. However, his 
argument demonstrates the very reneging on responsibility that Tubbs finds so 
problematic. Derrida has regularly demonstrated the impossibility of moving beyond 
metaphysics-the very attempt to move beyond it sets up a binary opposition that is 
integral to metaphysics. Derrida shows the importance that the metaphysics of presence 
has for the moral life. Although we should not succumb to the lure of foundationalism 
(presence), the conjuration of presence is what allows us to take responsibility for 
anything-the fact that presence exists in the form of the 'trace' is what allows us 
to take a stand on things. Problems do not arise by taking a stand in regards to a 
particular issue. Rather, they emerge when that stand is conceived of in absolutist 
or foundationalist terms-when we think we've found the 'authentic' solution to a 
problem and fail to acknowledge that problem's undecidable aspect. It should also 
be noted that Heidegger does not manage to avoid taking a moral stance in regard to 
the technological understanding of Being. If he did not think there was something 
wrong with it, then he would not spend so much time and effort in trying to think 
outsidelbeyond it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Itani's suspicion of 'naive' approaches to ethics and ontology (which often involve 
the conjuration of an authentic space) is well founded. However, the thrust of his 
argument moves towards a primal authenticity that is not realisable-there is no way 
of going beyond metaphysics. Following Tubbs and Derrida, perhaps what is needed 
is the recognition of the ethical problems that surround ontological approaches to 
education so that they might be addressed. This would not involve the evocation of 
a primal space but a form of action that acknowledges the logic of the trace and an 
understanding of 'spirit' as struggle. If we act in the knowledge that no absolute 
solution can be found-that questions of value cannot be avoided-we acknowledge 
our vulnerability and are consequently open to the limits of 'openness'. 
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